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1. Introduction 
Maintaining a stable currency value is the most important task that a cen-
tral bank has to tackle as the sole issuer of the currency. At the same time， an 
important precondition for achieving stable economic growth is the main-
tenance and development of a safe and sound financial system. Therefore， 
those two policy goals are essential for the fulfillment ofthe roles as the guardi-
an of the currrency and， accordingly， are commonly shared among central 
banks in the world. 
Quite recently in Japan， the financial system has been experiencing serious 
difficulties as a consequence of successive waves of asset inflation and deflation 
since the latter half of 1980s. The quality of bank loans has deteriorated sig田
nificantly because of the fal in land and stock prices: the total amount of non-
performing assets held by financial institutions has increased significantly. 
Therefore， the immediate task for the J apanese financial institutions should be 
to write-off the non-prforming assets as soon as possible. But， inthe long-run， 
the prudential supervision by regulartory agencies should be improved in vari-
ous aspects such as the bankruptcy procedures， the accounting rules as well as 
the disclosure of information. 
After this introductory section， Section I is to present a brief explanation 
about the prudential policy by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). Section II reviews 
the recent changes in the J apanese financial system. Section IV points out the 
recent problems of the Japanese banks. Section V and VI are explanations 
about the bankruptcy procedures and the Deposit Insurance System in J apan 
respectively. Section VII is to conclude this paper. 
1. Prudential Supervision by the Bank of Japan 
1. Importance of a Safe and Sound Financial System 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) isresponsible for the maintenance of a safe and 
sound financial (or credit) system， inaddition to the maintenance of the value 
of the currency， asstipulated in Article 1 of the Bank of J apan Law as follows: 
This paper was presented at the Seminar on Fiscal Policy in Macroeconomic 
Management， which had been organized by Vietnam Asia. Pacific Economic Center 
(V APEC) and Institute of Global Financial Studies (lGFS)， F AIR， JAPAN. The Semi-
nar was held at Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City on Janu紅y17-19， 1994.1 would like to 
thank Messrs. Yuichiro Nagatomi， Vu Quang Tuyen， and Tran Van Tho for their valu-
able comments. 
“The BOJ has for its object the regulation of the curency， the control and 
facilitation of credit and宣nance，and the maintenance and fostering of the 
credit syst開 1，pursuant to the national policy， inorder that the general eco-
nomic activities of the nation might adequately be enhanced." 
Ensuring a safe and sound iinancial system has recently gained importance 
as one of the policy objectives of central banks in the wor1d， inc1uding the 
BOJ. The progress in data-processing and telecommunications technology and 
the development of iinancial globalization have dramatically altered the en-
vironment surrounding centra1 bank policy. 
First， the progress in data-processing and telecommunications has had a sig-
niiicant impact upon the iinancia1 system since iinancia1 institutions are one of 
the largest users of those technologies. In particular， such innovation in tech-
nology has contributed to the enormous increase in the volume of iinancia1 
transactions requiring settlements by enabling a spontaneous transfer of data 
and information in large sca1e. It has also contributed to the iinancial deregula-
tion in the sense that various iinancial products and services have been newly 
developed thanks to the technological innovations and that， accordingly， new 
financia1 markets have been established. In such circumstances， potentia1 risks 
for both individua1 iinancia1 institutions and the iinancia1 system as a whole 
have significantly increased. This is because the larger volume of financia1 trans-
actions tends to bring about larger potentia1 risks， such as liquidity risks and 
credit risks， for individua1 financia1 institutions and a1so greater “systemic 
risks" for the iinancia1 system as a whole. For example， when a particular 
iinancial institution faces iinancial distress， i. e.， liquidity or solvency problem， 
that may be transmitted to others through the contagion effect， and ultimately 
affect the iinancia1 system as a whole. Moreover， ifa iinancial institution is una-
ble to setle its position， other participating institutions may incur losses 
through a chain reaction in the payment system. 
Second， the globa1ization of iinancia1 markets has made payment systems 
in Japan more c10sely interdependent with those in overseas countries. In a 
more speciiic way， Japanese banks have expanded internationally and an in-
creasing number of foreign iinancia1 institutions have entered the Japanese 
iinancial markets. Accordingly， ifa settlement failure arises in Japan， it may 
be transmitted to foreign countries and vice versa. In such circumstances， inter-
national cooperation with regard to prudential supervision has been necessitat-
ed， particularly among central banks. As such example of intern 
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and 1992 respectively. With respect to payment systems oversight， the central 
bank governors of the Group of Ten countries published a report by the BIS 
Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes in November 1990. In consideration 
of the report， the Governors endorsed the minimum standards for the design 
and opertion of cross幽borderand multi-country netting and settlement 
schemes set out in the report and a1so agreed to adopt the principles for cooper-
ative centra1 bank oversight of netting systems. 
2. The Activities of the BOJ in Order to Maintain a Safe and Sound 
Financial System 
The activities the BOJ engages in so as to maintain a safe and sound finan同
cial system are three-fold first， the BOJ facilitates settlements by issuing 
banknotes and transferring funds between current deposit accounts lodged in 
it by private financia1 institutions ; second， the BOJ monitors the daily opera-
tions of financia1 institutions and conducts on-site examinations of those insti-
tutions; third， the BOJ acts as the “Lender of Last Resort. "(1) 
a. Provision of Payment Instruments and Payment Services 
In Japan the BOJ is the sole issuer of banknotes， which are the legal tender 
for settling transactions as well as coins issued by the Government. The BOJ 
also provides financial institutions with current deposit accounts through 
which financial transactions among various financial institutions are sett1ed 
with“fina1ity." In addition， in由earea of securities settlement， the BOJ han-
dles the registration and book entry system with respect to Government bonds， 
thus making it unnecess町Yto physica11y convey those bonds from place to 
place. 
Faced with rapid developments in computer technology and data proc-
essing as well as financial deregulation and the progress of internationaliza-
tion， the BOJ has been making its efforts to enhance the efficiency and reliabi1-
ity of J apans settlement system， soas to harmonize them with international 
standards and practices. In particular， the BOJ has launched an on-line sett1e-
ment network called BOJ-NET， which provides an electronic-based facility for 
operations such as current account transfers， and registration and book-entry 
for Government bonds. 
Thus the BOJ plays an important role in the smooth functioning of the 
c1earing and settlement system in Japan. In this respect， it is also involved in 
the formation of rules and practices concerning the Bil and Check Clearing 
System， the Domestic Funds Transfer System， and the Foreign Exchange Yen 
Settlement System. 
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b. Monitoring and Supervision 
It is important for the BOJ to be informed， assoon and as accurately as pos-
sible， ofthe business conditions of the country's financial institutions and the 
surrounding market environment. For this purpose， the Credit and Manage-
ment Department of the BOJ monitor the daily operations of financial institu-
tions and its Bank Supervision Department regularly conducts on-site examina-
tions of them. 
When conducting on-site examinations， the BOJ staf has traditionally 
been paying c10se attention to the soundness of loan assets in order to evaluate 
the capitallevel and the effiiency of risk management. The BOJ staf evaluates 
the quality of individualloans of a financial institution， focusing on collectibi1i-
ty， then calculate the ratio of pro blem loans to totalloans and ultimately assess 
whether the ratio would be excessive or not in comparison with the capitallevel 
of that financial institution. While evaluating the asset quality， the BOJ staff 
also investigate the credit analysis and risk management system of that fina任
cial institution in order to evaluate their lending policies and disciplines with 
respect to controlling credit risks. More recently， however， the BOJ staff has 
also come to pay c10se attention to various risks such as interest rate risks， for-
eign exchange risks， and systemic risks. 
It shoud be noted that the supervision by the BOJ is different in purpose 
from the inspection by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The BOJ exercises its 
authority as the Lender of Last Resort and gives expert advice after having 
c10sely surveyed the management situation of each financial institution. On the 
other hand， the MOF inspections are conducted in order to detect violations of 
the Banking Law and the Securities and Exchange Law. Despite such difer-
ences， the BOJ and the MOF share the common policy objectives of maintain-
ing a safe and sound financial system. 
c. Lender of Last Resort 
The last， but the most important role of the BOJ in maintaining a safe and 
sound financial system is to exercise its “Lender of .Last Resort" functions. 
When the possibility of a financial institution becoming insolvent was consi-
dered to pose an important threat to the credibility of the financial system as a 
whole， which might perhaps trigger a collapse in confidence， a central bank 
would be necessitated to take preventive measures by extending credit to such 
financial institutions. For example， the BOJ extended uncollater叫izedloans to 
the Yamaichi Securities House and others in distress in the securities depres開
sion of 1965. (2) 
It should be added that the BOJ maintains c10se communication with the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation， whose office of the Chairman is to be assumed 
by the Senior Deputy Governor of the BOJ. More detailed expalanation about 
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the Deposit Insurance System in J apan wil be presented in Section VI. 
11. The Japanese Financial System 
1. Characteristics of the Japanese Financial System 
TheJapan郎efinancial system which had been rather well developed during 
the Meiji and Taisyo periods and was reorganized after the Second World War 
has been characterized with a) functional separation of private financial institu-
tions， b)interest rate regulation， and c) regulation over international transac-
tions. 
FunctionalS句parationof Private Financial Institutions 
The first characteristic has been the functional separation of private finan-
cial institutions. The greater role of the financial system within the national 
economy can be observed in some other countries than in Japan， but what has 
really been characteristic with the Japanese financial system is the fact that the 
rather strict allocation of individual functions among different categories of 
financia1 institutins has been observed. Such a110cation of financiaI functions 
have been seen in the separation between long-term finance and short-term 
finance， the separation between deposit banks and trust banks， and the separa-
tion between banks and securities houses. 
The separation of Iong-term finance and short-term finance has been based 
on the commercial banking phiIosophy similar to that of the United Kingdom 
and was first introduced to the Japanese financial system in 1882， the year the 
BOJ was estabIished. Documents related to the BOJ Charter emphasized a 
very clear distinction between commercial funds related to transactions of com-
modities and agricultural or munufacturing funds related to promoting produc-
tions in those sectors. In 1952 Long幽TermCredit Bank Law was enacted based 
on such philosophy and， accordingly， Iong-term credit banks which specialized 
in long-term finance and could float financiaI debentures were established. For 
those financial institutions that rely on the gathering of deposits as the primary 
sourse of funds， thぽeare currently no Iegal provisions regarding the maturity 
of funds raised as weII as funds utiIized. However， the MOF exercises an ad-
ministrative guidance with respect to maturity of deposits in order to avoid 
conflicts between such deposits and financial debentures issued by long-term 
credit banks. 
The separation of banking business and trust business was made cIear in 
the Trust Law and the Trust Business Law， both of which were enacted in 
1922. The primary reason for such separation was not the conflict of interests， 
but was rather the separation of long-term finance from short-term finance. In 
1948， however， trust companies were converted into banks and were permited 
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to conduct banking business as well as trust business at that time. But， in1952， 
the MOF promoted the separation between banks and trust banks through en-
forcing mergers between trust departments of banks and trust banks， while the 
MOF permitted trust banks to offer“loan trust" to their customers. 
The separarion of banking business and securities business has had its roots 
in the concept of commercial banking. The idea was that banks may impair 
their stability by holding equity shares or long-term bonds because such assets 
tend to suffer from large price fluctuations. Also the conflict of interests has 
been a very important factor in supporting the separation between banks and 
securities houses. In the period before the Second World War， there were no 
legal provisions concerning the separation between banking and securities ac-
tivities， but in fact there existed an informal practice of such separation. In the 
post欄warperiod， the separation was legally established by Article 65 of the 
Securities and Exchange Law of 1948， which was based on the Glass-Steagall 
Act of the United States. The acceptance of this Law succeeded the informal 
practice of the separation in the pre-war period. Article 65 of the Securities 
and Exchange Law prohibits banks from engaging in securities business except 
in cases where there is an investment purpose or a trust contract. The Article 
also allows exceptions for banks' bond businesses of government bonds， local 
government bonds， and government-guaranteed bonds. In actual practice， 
however， banks engaged only in the underwriting of government bonds during 
the high growth period in the 1960s. The other bond businesses allowed by the 
Law were in fact prohibited by the administrative guidance of the MOF. 
Interest Rate Regulation 
The second characteristic of the Japannese financial system has been relat-
ed to interest rate regulation. The first agreement on regulating deposit interest 
rate with enforcement provisions was set in 1918. The motivation for banks to 
establish such agreement was to avoid a banking crisis as a result of interest 
rate competition in gathering deposits. There existed a strong fear that such 
competition might have weakened the soundness of banks. 
In December 1947， the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law was 
promulgated and implemented. Under the Law the Minister of Finance deter-
mines whether or not interrest regulation is necessary in the light of general eco・
nomic conditions and then， ifnecessary， the Policy Board of the BOJ should 
seek the advice of the Interest Rate Adjustment Council. At present such proc-
ess of determining the upper limits on deposit interest rates stil holds， 
although significant portion of deposits of financial institutions has already 
been in the category of deposits with liberalized interest rates. 
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Foreign Exchange Control 
The third characteristic of the J apannese financial system has been related 
to foreign exchange control. Rather strict control of foreign exchange during 
the high growth period in the 1960s meant that there was a segmentation be-
tween domestic and foreign financial markets. As time passed， however， such 
regulation concerning forein exchange control was gradually eased in line with 
the international trend of liberalizing capital movement across borders. 
2. Recent Changes in the Japanese Financial System 
Recently the J apanese financial system has been experiencing various 
changes such as a) the deregulation of the separation of financial institutions， 
b) the liberalization of interest rates， and c) the dereguration of foreign ex-
change transactions. 
Dereguration of the Separation of Financial Institutions 
The first change is the dereguration of the separation of financial institu-
tions， namely， the expansion of business area as well as trends towards revising 
regulations enforcing separation. 
Regulations concerning the business areas of financial institutions have 
been liberalized in recent years. For example， banks have been allowed to han-
dle many securities activities， starting with the over-the-counter sale of govern-
ment bonds in April 1983. A wide range of banking institutions from city 
banks to credit cooperatives are now permitted to handle those bonds. Also， 
dealing in public bonds by banks was begun in 1984 and the scope of banking 
institutions which are permitted to deal in those bonds has been gradually broa-
dened since then. Furthermore， inNovember 1988 banks were allowed to mar-
ket their housing loan mortgage trusts. 
Meanwhile， in1984 securities companies developed， through tie-up with 
shinkin banks， a new financi~l instrument which linked medium-term govern-
ment bond funds with bank deposits. With such financial innovation， the medi-
um-term government bond funds became a de facto settlement account， even 
though settlements must be done through an ordinary bank deposit account. 
Despite the fact that the business activities of the different financial institu-
tions are becoming increasingly similar due to the expansion of bu~iness area 
of individual categories of financial institutions， there stil remain fundamental 
regulations that divide institutional categories. However， the restructuring of 
the Japanese financial system hae been seen recently. For example， the Finan-
cial System Committee of the Financial System Research Council， an advisory 
body to the Minister of Finance， published a report entitled “On a New 
Japanese Financial System" in June 1991. 1n this report the Committee con-
c1uded that mutual entries among individual financial categories in the form of 
-7ー
separated subsidiaries would be the appropriate approach towards a new finan-
cial system. Also the Securities Exchange Council， another advisory body to 
the Minister of Finance， discussed the revision of regulations concerning the 
separation of financial institutions. The Second Sub-committee for Fundamen-
tal Research of the Council published its report in June 1991 and concluded 
that the establishment of separated subsidiaries would be appropriate. Subse圃
quently， Law Concerning the Reform of the Financial System was enacted in 
June 1992 and it became possible for ordinary banks， long-term credit banks， 
trust banks， and securities houses to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries in the 
designated fianncial categories， starting from April 1993. Although there are 
stil important restrictions in terms of type of business which banks or securi-
ties houses can engage in (e.g. banks are not allowed to engage in stock-brok-
ing) and relatively strict firewalls exist between parents and subsidiaries， the 
first securities subsidiaries formed by 2 long-term credit banks， the Norinchu-
kin Bank， and 2 trust banks started operation in July 1993. Trust banks 
formed by 4 securities houses and the Bank of Tokyo started operation in Oc-
tober 1993. Big city banks have to wait a bit before embarking upon securities 
activities in order to mitigate the adverse impact of the simultaneous entry of 
many bank subsidiaries on small securities houses. 
As for the segmentation of the banking system， the demarcations which 
separated various specialized banks have gradually and effectively been 
reduced and the trend will continue. 
Liberalization olInterest Rates 
The second change is the liberalization of interest rates. At first， the large is-
suance of long-term government bonds in the late 1970s triggered the liberaliza-
tion of long-term interest rates as the auction method for many types of govern-
ment bonds expanded in the ear1y 1980s. 
Deposit interest rates were steadily liberalized from 1979. At first， CDs 
were introduced in 1979. Large-denomination time deposits bearing market 
rates and money market certificates (MMCs) were introduced in 1985， small-
denomination MMCs in 1989， and restrictions on minimum amount and 
maturity of such deposits were gradually relaxed thereafter. 1n June 1993， in欄
terest rates on time deposits became virtually free of any regulation. As a result 
of such deregulation， deposits at city banks bearing market-determined in-
terest rates as a percentage of total deposits were al over 70% in 1990， com-
pared with only 22% in 1985. 
The remaining regulated deposit interest rates， i.e.， liquid deposit interest 
rates， will be liberalized during 1994 except those on current deposits (checking 
accounts) whose rates will remain regulated to be at 0%. 
Meanwhile， since November 1988 the BOJ made an effort in reforming the 
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interbank money markets， namely cal and bil markets， sothat the interbank 
rates would reflect the market conditions smoothly and the arbitrage transac-
tions between interbank markets and various open markets would be en-
hanced. Thanks to the diversification ofthe open markets and reform ofthe in-
terbank markets， inter-market arbitrage has been significantly increased since 
the 1980s. In order for money market operations to be effective， however， a 
well-developed money market where a central bank can conduct operations 
fiexibly is essential and in case of Japan short-term government bils market 
needs to be developed. 
Liberalization 01 Foreign Exchange Regulations 
The third change is the liberalization of foreign exchange regulations. The 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was fully revised in 1980 
and the basic prinsiples concerning the internatioal capital movement was 
changed from one of “prohibition" to one of “freely a110wed， " though regu-
lated in case of emergency. 
In May 1984， areport bythe Joint Japan-U. S. Ad Hoc Group on Yen/Dol-
lar Exchange Rate， Financial and Capital Market Issues suggested a number of 
deregulations with respect to both the raising and investing of funds by banks 
and other entities so as to promote the internationa1ization of the yen. Includ-
ed among them were the remova1 of limits on the oversold spot foreign ex-
change positions of banks (i.e.， yen conversion limits)， the liberalization of Eu-
royen trading， and the elimination of the socalled“real demand rule" for for-
ward exchange transactions. The rule stated that foreign exchange transactions 
between banks and their customers should be based on “real transactions" 
such as commodities trade. 
All such measures contributed to expanding internationa1 financial transac-
tions. The lifting of yen conversion limits resulted in expanding Euroyen inter-
bank transactions and Eurodollar transactions with foreign exchange swaps， 
which in turn contributed most significantly to increased arbitrage between 
domestic interbank and open markets. 
IV. Recent Problems of the Japanese Banking Sector 
1. Cbanging Behaviour of Banks and Hikes in Asset Prices 
In the second half of the 1980s， there were significant changes in the en-
vironment in which the Japanese banks operated as have already been stated in 
Section II of this paper. The most conspicuous response of the Japanese 
banks to the actua1 and potential loss of their franchize value as a result of 
financia1liberalization was to expand lendings to les traditional areas， inpar-
ticular to real estate and non-bank firms. 
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Between 1985 and 1992， bank loans to the rea1 estate industry grew 13.7% 
annually， compared with 6.6% for total bank lending， and the share of such 
loans to total bank lending rose from 7.5% in 1985 to 12.1 % in 1992. Lending 
to non-banks also grew rapidly， from 10.4% to 14.0% of total bank lending. 
Many of these non-banks were bank afiliates whose purpose was to lend to 
rea1 setate firms and effect equity investments. Banks also expanded their equi-
ty portfolios， direct1y， orindirect1y through special trust funds (tokkin funds 
etc). Similar behaviour was observed on the part ofmany agricultural coopera-
tives. 
The increase in rea1 estate prices in centra1 Tokyo had a1ready started in the 
early 1980s， but accelerated sharply around 1986-87. The rapid increase grad開
ually spread to the suburbs of Tokyo and to other major cities. The increase in 
stock prices accelerated virtual1y hand in hand with the rise in land prises. 
Several non-monetary factors are cited as background to the rise in land 
prices， among others: a) the increased importance of Tokyo as a major world 
financial and trade center， and b) the favourable tax treatment of investments 
in land-the effective inheritance tax on real estate was much lower than on 
other assets; the capital gains tax could be avoided if income from the sa1e of 
real estate was reinvested in other real estate. 
It is also true that the economic environment and macro economic policy 
contributed significant1y to the increase in asset prices. Monetary ease con-
tinued: the oficial discount rate of the BOJ， which had already been lowered 
four times in a short period， was lowered again to a historica11y low level of 
2.5% in Feburuary 1987 and remained there until mid・1989.The economy， 
which had been in recession due mainly to the deflationary impact of the sub-
stantial appreciation of the yen， exhibited signs of recovery around the end of 
1986 and then showed brisk growth in 1987 and 1988. However， monetary poli-
cy was not changed as prices of goods and services remained stable due to the 
appreciation of the yen， instark contrast to the sharp rise in land and stock 
pnces. 
Since the latter half of the 1970s the BOJ has paid its attention to the broad-
ly defined money stock and， inparticular， has published the quarter1y forecasts 
of M2 + CDs. The BOJ， however， has not adopted the monetary targeting poli・
cy， but has followed a more pragmatic approach in the sense that it has not set 
any target zones of th 
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late 1970s and the ear1y 1980s. At the same time， the growth rates of nominal 
GNP and of GNP deflator have followed a dec1ining trend almost in para11el 
with those of M2+CDs. Since the mid-1980s， however， the growth rates of 
M2 + CDs have been accelerated to double-digits， whi1e inflation measured by 
CPI and WPI has been kept at relatively low leve1. In contrast， ash邸副ready
been mentioned， prices of stock shares and rea1 estates have continued to so紅
to the historica11y highest levels until the end of 1980s. 
2. Decline in Asset Prices and Policy Reaction 
By ear1y 1989 it became evident that inflationary pressures were mounting， 
and monetary policy was tightened in May 1989. The MOF， for its part， asked 
the banks in 1990 to contain the growth of their real estate-related lending to 
les than that of totallending. Asset prices continued to rise for a whi1e there-
after， but stopped rising or started to dec1ine around the end of 1989. TheNik-
kei Stock Average Index peaked in December 1989 at 38，917副ldfel rapidly 
to record a low of 14， 309 in August 1992. The movement of land prices varied 
considerably from region to region， but c1e訂lychanged to a downturn in 1990. 
In the meantime， the growth rates of M2+CDs have indicated a sharp 
decline to the historically lowest level of ー0.5%and ・幽幽0.2%over the previous 
year in the fourth quarter of 1992 and the first quarter of 1993 respectively. 
The qua1ity of bank loans deteriorated significantly as a consequence of the 
fal in land and stock prises: tota1 non-performing assets held by city banks， 
the bulk of which consisted of loans to rea1 estate and non-bank firms， stood at 
I12.8 tril1ion at the end March 1993， or3.2% of tota1 outstanding loans， and 
thus recorded a 60% increase in only one ye町.
Banks and financia1 institutions encountering difficulties have recieved sup-
port from others in the sector， either by merger or substantial financia1 as-
sistance. An example of the former was the merger of the Toho Sogo Bank， a 
small regional bank which became insolvent， with the Iyo Bank， a larger and 
sound bank in the same region ; and a typical example of the latter was the as圃
sistance provided by banks to ^ゆ']JonHousing Loan， a non-bank specializing 
in mortgages and which held a vast amount of non-performing assets， the 
failure of which would have caused serious problems for agricultura1 cooper-
tives. Another joint effort of the banking sector to overcome current dificul-
ties was the establ1ishment of the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Corporation 
(CCPC)， an institution designed to facilitate the liquidation of the real estate 
assets of banks. 
V. Bankruptcy Proceedings in Japan 
In this section we would like to explain the proceedings available under the 
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Japanese law designed for or having the e:fect of relieving or otherwise dea1ing 
with those banking institutions which are on the verge of bankruptcy. We in幽
tend to cover not only the statutory bankruptcy， but a1so other available 
proc田dingsand procedures which are designed for or have the e:fect of reliev-
ing financially disabled banks as much as possible. Such proceedings include 
mergers or acquisitions by profitable banks of those other banks which are in 
financial distress， various proceedings or action which may be taken by a 
regulartory agency for or against banks in financial distress， such as temporary 
suspension of their banking business and a:fairs or permanent termination of 
their banking business licenses. 
1. Applicable Statutes 
When a bank is in serious financia1 distress and is unable to continue its bus-
iness in the same way as before， then it will， like any other corporation， natural-
ly be subject to statutory bankruptcy proceedings under the bankruptcy law， 
which includes the Bankruptcy Act (Hasan Ho， hereinafter referred to as 
“BA")， the Stock Company Reorganization and Rehabilitation Act (Kaisya 
Kosei Ho， hereinafter referred to as “SCRRA")， the Arrangement Act (Wagi 
Ho， hereinafter referred to as “AA") and the related provisions governing cor-
porate reorganization and special liquidation proceedings of stock corpor副.
tons included in the Commercia1 Code (Sho Ho， hereinafter referred to as 
“Code"). All of those statutory bankruptcy proceedings， ifapplied to a bank， 
have the e:fect of liquidating or reorganizing the bank through a unified and 
blanket legal procedures designed to adjust in an equitable manner the rights 
and interests of al parties who have valid c1aims against the bank， under the su-
pervision of the court. 
All banks are required under Article 4.1 of the Banking Act to obtain and 
maintain a va1id banking business license in order to engage or remain in the 
banking business. Their dissolution and liquidation procedures are inevitably 
a:fected by the Banking Act， since the Minister of Finance has the power and 
authority to permanently terminate their banking business licenses under cer-
tain circumstances therein specified. In addition， banks husiness and a:fairs 
may be a:fected by the Deposit Insurance Act (Yokin Hoken Ho， hereinafter 
referred to as“DIA")， which provides certain insurance coverage for the pro・
tection of depositors. 
In addition to the statutory bankruptcy proceedings， there are， ina much 
broader sense， other proceedings which are a1so designed for or have the e:fect 
of relieving financially unhea1thy banks. Included among them is the merger of 
a bank which is in a financia11y unhea1thy condition into another bank which is 
financia11y healthy and profitable. Such a merger is subject to the specia1 
procedural rules set forth in the Banking Act， and the Act Governing Mergers 
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between and Conversion of Banking Institutions (Kinyukikan No Gappei Oyo・
bi Tenkan Ni Kansuru Ho， hereinafter referred to as the “M&C Act")， whose 
primary purpose is to regulate mergers between or among two or more banking 
institutions of different kinds. DIA may become operative， among ohter situa-
tions， inor near bankruptcy， because， for the purpose of facilitating the liq-
uidation or rehabilitation of a bank in financial distress， DIA authorizes and 
empowers the Minister of Finance to act as an intermediary to promote and ex-
pedite the merger of the bank into another bank or the acquisition by any 
other bank or banks of a11 or substantially al its assets and/or capital stock 
shares on one hand， and gives such other bank or banks a chance to avail them-
selves of “Financia1 Assistance" provided by the Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion thereunder on the other hand. 
2. Bankruptcy Proceedings Categorized 
In general， the bankruptcy proceedings， which are designed for or have the 
effect of liquidating or rehabilitating a financially unhealthy bank， such as a 
bank with an extremely poor equity ratio， can be classified into the following 
three categories: 
(1) liquidation type proceedings-to wind-up a financially unhealthy 
bank and distribute its asets to its creditors and sh町eholders.Special 
liquidation proceedings under the Code and bankruptcy proceedings 
under BA come under this category; 
(2) rehabi1tation type proceedings-to reorganize and rehabi1tate a 
financially unhealthy bank; 
(3) merger & acquisition type proceedingsー tolet a bank or banks in a 
sound financial condition to acquire and assume the asets and liabili-
ties of a financially unhealthy bank. 
Liquidation ηI[Je Proceedings 
(a) Special Liquidation Proceedings under the Code and Permanent Ter-
mination of Banking Business License under the Banking Act 
Special liquidation proceedings under the Code are proceedings designed 
specifically for corporations of which ordinary liquidation proceedings have al・
ready commended， with cooperation among their creditors and trustees， who 
are usually appointed among their respective chief exuecutive officers. (Articles 
431 through 456). The proceedings can be triggered only when such corpora-
tions are found to be in any“condition or circumstances which may substan-
tialy interfere with the procecution of [their normal] liquidation proceedings" 
or there is“a suspicion of [their] insolvency." (Article 431. 1). Once these 
proceedings are triggered， ithas the effect of eliminating the bankruptcy 
proceedings under BA. Before liquidation proceedings (whether normal or spe-
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cial) can be effectively triggered with respect to any corporation， it must have 
passed a resolution of its dissolution or an order of its dissolution issued by an 
appropriate regulatory agency. ln case of a bank， however， it is also required 
to satisfy certain other requirements under the Banking Act， before it can trig-
ger the proceedings. The Banking Act， inArtic1e 26， authorizes the Minister of 
Finance to totally or partly suspend the banking business and affairs of any 
bank， ifand to the extent he or she deems it“necessary [to do so] in the light 
of the bank's [existing] operational and/or financial conditions." Artic1e 28 
thereof further authorizes him or her to permanently terminate at any time the 
banking business license of any bank whose banking business and affairs are 
for the time being suspended totally or partly by the Minister of Finance pur-
suant to Artic1e 26， ifhe or she finds it necessary [to do so] in the light of the 
progress of the [bank's] winding up proceedings.“The business and affairs of 
banks whose banking business licenses are so terminated must be wound up [in 
due course] and to go into liquidation proceedings or， ifthey are insolvent， 
then specialliquidation procedings under the Code. (Artic1e 40 and 44). 
(b) Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Bankruptcy proceedings are of proceedings in which a debtor， who is una-
ble to meet his or her debts when due or is deemed so because of the fact that 
he or she suspends payment in general or who is insolvent， can be adjudicated 
a bankrupt by a court， and the net proceeds realized from selling or otherwise 
liquidating his or her estate by a trustee can be distributed to his or her credi-
tors on a pro rata and equitable basis. (Artic1es 126 and 127 of BA). There ex-
ists no special rules with respect to how， when or who may file a petition in 
bankrupt by a court. But when a bank is adjudicated a bankrupt by a court， 
the court is required to notify the regulartory agency in charge of the bankrupt 
(i.e.， the Minister of Finance) of such adjudication， and by virtue of Artic1e 
404 of the Code the bank will 伊'sojacto be required to go into winding up 
proceedings and its banking license wil1 be nullified pursuant to Artic1e 41.3 of 
the Banking Act. 
Rehabilitation ηpe Proceedings 
The reorganization proceedings under SCRRA can be triggered by a court 
for the reorganization and rehabilitation of a stock corporation (Kabushiki 
Kaisya， orK. K. for short) which is“unable to meet its debts as and when they 
become due without causing any substantial inconvenience in the continuance 
of its operations" or which is “likely to commit any act of bankruptcy，" upon 
a petition filed by the corporation itself or any of its creditors or shareholders. 
(Artic1e 30.1). When reorganization proceedings thereunder are triggered with 
respect to any corporation， then a proposed reorganization and rehabi1tation 
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plan will be prepared pursuant to which， among other things， the rights and in-
terest of al parties concerned would be adjusted and modified， itsoutstanding 
debts adjusted and paid， itsbusiness and affairs administrated and its capital 
structure changed and， subject to the courts approva1， such plan wi1 be im-
plemented by a trustee appointed by the court， while it remains a going con-
cern. As is the case of bankruptcy proceedings mentioned earlier， there exists 
no special rules with respect to how， when or who may file a petition for the re-
organization and rehabi1litation of banks. But when a 抑制onfor the reorgani-
zation and rehabilitation is filed by or against a bank with a court or when the 
court grants the petition， the court is required under Artic1e 35 or 48 of 
SCRRA to notify the regulartory agency in charge of the bankrupt， namely the 
Minister of Finance， of such fact. Artic1e 194 of SCRRA guarantees the 
Minister of Finance opportunities to express his opinion or make comments on 
any and al1 draft plans for the reorganization and rehabilitation of banks filed 
with the court. It should be noted that since the reorganization proceedings do 
not necessari1y cause the winding up proceedings， the fact that a petition for re-
organization and rehabilitation has been filed and is pending alone does not 
operate as a valid cause for the permanent termination of its banking business 
license. 
Merger and Acquisition η'Pe Proceedings 
As mentioned earlier， a merger between two or more banks is genera11y sub-
ject to the relevant provisions of the Code inc1uding， but not limited to， Article 
408.1 which requires the parties to a merger to prepare and execute an appropri-
ate written merger agreement; Article 408.3 and 343 which require the merger 
agreement to be approved by a specia1 resolution of their respective sharehol・
ders adopted by a two-thirds majority of the voting rights represented at a 
shareholders 由eetingsat which shaeholders holding more than 50% of the out-
standing voting sh紅esare present; Article 408-111 which gives dissenting sh町e-
holders an appr出a1remedy or a put option to sel由eirsh紅白tothe company 
of which they are shareholders at fair market va1ue; Artic1e 100 and 416 which 
guarantee creditors opportunities to file objections against the proposed merg-
er to protect their own interests; and Artic1e 414 requires that upon consumma-
tion of the merger， appropriate 自lingsbe promptly made at al loca1 lega1 
affairs bureaus having jurisdiction over the parties to the merger.問
The statutory requirements under the provision of the Code， however， are 
somewhat intensified or mitigated by the Banking Act， tothe extent they are ap-
plicable to merger of banks. For example， Artic1e 30 of the Banking Act makes 
al mergers between any two or more banks further subject to the approva1 of 
the Minister of Finance， while banks who are parties to a merger are exempted 
from the obligation to give notice of the merger individually to their creditors 
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including their client depositors. In Japan， inaddition to ordinary banks， there 
are several other types of banking institutions. Each type has its own law 
which regulates entities belonging to that type and their business. The M&A 
Act makes it possible for any two or more banking institutions of different 
types to merge， which would not be otherwise possible. 
DIA includes intricate provisions regulating the merger of a financially un-
healthy banking institutions into another financially healthy and profitable in-
stitutions. Article 59 of DIA states that any banking institution which is finan-
cially healthy and profitable and which is going to merge， asthe surviving enti-
ty， with any financially unhealthy banking institutions or acquires al or any 
p町tof the assets and/or capital stock shares of such financially unhealthy 
banking institutions may， inorder to facilitate such merger or acquisition， re-
quest the Deposit Insurance Corpotarion to extend“Financial Assistance." 
The term “Financial Assistance" means， by definition， the donation of cash 
funds， extension of loans， purchase of assets and assumption and guarantee of 
debts. 
Technically speaking， ifthe Deposit Insurance Corporation pays insurance 
proceeds to depositors of a financially disabled bank pursuant to DIA， such de-
cision or payment is solely for the purpose of prot，∞ting the depositors with a 
view to maintaining the credibility of the nation's financial system as a whole， 
and it is totally independedt from the liquidation or rehabilitation of such disa-
bled bank. When the “First Class Insurance Risk Situation， " which term is de圏
直nedto mean suspension of payment to depositors， occurs with respect to any 
bank， or when “Second Class Insurance Risk Situation，" which term is de-
fined to mean and include the termination of the banking business license， ad-
judication of bankruptcy or passing of a resolution of dissolution， occurs with 
respect to叩 ybank， DIA entitles each and every depositor to file an insurance 
cl副mwith the Deposit Insurance Corporation and obtain insurance proceeds 
out of the Corporations funds to the amount of I10 mi1ion per depositor. 
3. Relationship among Various Bankruptcy Proceedings 
In Japan bankruptcy proceedings applicable to banks are subject to not 
only the general rules and principles set forth in the Civil Code and the Com圃
mercial Code， but also to those set forth in three other groups of law: namely， 
a) the Banking Act (in relation to the temporary suspension of the banking bus-
iness and affairs or the termination of a banking business license): b) the 
bankruptcy law， which includes the provisions of the Code relating to special 
liquidation proceedings， BA and SCRRA; andのDIA(in relation to“Fin加-
cial Assistanse" to expedite mergers and acquisitions and payment of insur'幽
ance proceeds). Unfortunately， from the practical point ofview， they are very 
complicated in that a) one cause or event which may act as a trigger for any 
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proceedings against a bank under one of the three groups of law dose not neces・
sari1y so act for any proceedings against the bank under any other group of 
law， which fact often creates a situation where the time to initiate proceedings 
under one group of law has elapsed， but it has not under any of the other 
groups of1aw， i.e.， the problem oftiming difference; b) the parties who are en-
tit1ed to file a petition for or initiate proceedings against a bank or to make deci-
sions thereunder are different as from one group of law to another， i.e.， the 
problem of the lack of uniformity in parties; c) there may be cases where two 
or more proceedings under two or more di宜erentgroups of laws are pending 
against one and the same bank， either with or without cooperation or coordinル
tion between them， i.e.， the problem of the cumulative nature of proceedings; 
and d) how and to what extent bankruptcy proceedings， ifinitiated against any 
bank， wil1 affect the banks banking business license is not a1together clear， i.e.， 
the problem of uncertainty. 
VI. The Deposit Insurance System in J apan 
In this Section we will brie:fly explain the Deposit Insurance System in 
J apan. As has a1ready been mentioned above， the Deposit Insurance Syetem 
can play an important role in promoting the merger and acquisitions of finan-
cia11y unhealthy banks by financial1y hea1thy and profitable banks. In fact， the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation implemented， for the first time in its history， 
the “Financial Assistance" in Apri11992. 
1. Framework of the Deposit Insurance System 
The Deposit Insurance System in Japan was created under the DIA which 
was promulgated and enforced in Apri11971. DIA stipulates that the aim of 
the System is to protect depositors with a view to maintaining the stabi1ty of 
the financial system， by either making insurance payments to depositors in the 
event of the suspension of deposit repayments， or extending “Financia1 As-
sistance" to facilitate mergers or acquisitions of failing financia1 institutions. 
Financial institutions which are legal1y obligated to participate in the Deposit 
Insurance System inc1ude al1 the fol1owing types of financial institutions with 
headquarters in J apan: a) Banks (city banks， regiona1 banks， member banks of 
the Second Association of Regional Banks， trust banks， long-term credit 
banks)， b)Shinkin banks， c)Credit cooperatives， d)Labor banks. Govern-
ment-related financial institutions and J apanese branches of foreign banks are 
not covered by this System. 
It should be noted that the insurance relationship arises automatica11y 
among the Deposit Insurance Corporation， financial institutions， and their 
depositors when financial institutions accept insured deposits. The fol1owing 
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deposits and other liabilities of member institutions are insured under the Sys-
tem: a) Deposits， b)1nstallment savings， c)Money-in-trust whose principal has 
been guaranteed， specifically jointly managed designated money trusts， and 
loan trusts. 
The Deposit 1nsurance Corporation (D1C) was created in July 1971 under 
the provisions of the D1A for the purpose of operating the Deposit 1nsurance 
System. The Corporation was capitalized at V455 million， ofwhich the Govern-
ment and the BOJ subscribed to V150 milIion respectively. The remaining V155 
million was provided by private financia1 institutions. 
The D1C's decision-making body is the Management Committee which co恥
sists of the Govenor (concurrently， the Deputy Governor of the BOJ)， the Ex-
ecutive Director， and the other six members. Those members are appointed by 
the Governor with the approval of the Minister of Finance from among per嗣
sons with expertise in financial fields. At present， the Chairman of the Federa-
tion of Bankers Association of J apan and other representatives of the financial 
communities are serving on this Committee. 
The major functions of D1C inc1ude the collection of insurance premiums， 
payment of insurance c1aims， execution of“Financial Assistance" and the 
management of funds. 
Member institutions must pay premiums to the Deposit 1nsurance Corpora圃
tion within 3 months of the beginning of each business year. The premium 
ainount to be paid is calculated by multiplying the premium rate (currently 
0.012%) and the total balance of insured deposits held by a financial institu-
tion at the end of the preceding business year. 
All surpluses of the Corporation derived from insurance premiums and 
other revenues are accumulated in the Deposit 1nsurance Fund to be used， 
when and if necessary. At the end of March 1993， the outstanding ba1ance in 
the Deposit 1nsurance Fund stood at '1.770 billion. The Corporation is legally 
authorized to borrow funds within a designated limit (currently， '1.500 billion) 
from the BOJ. 
D1C makes insurance payments in the fol1owing two types of situations: a) 
First Class 1nsurance Riskー Claimsarising from the suspension of the repay同
ment of deposits in financial institutions， and b) Second Class 1nsurance 
Risk-Claims arising from the cancellation of a financial institutions' operat-
ing license， the dec1aration of bankruptcy， orthe resolution to dissolve the 
financial institution. 1n case of Fi 
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tion， not exceeding the sum of 110 million per individual depositor. 
Whena “failing financial institution" suspends the repayment of deposits 
or is in the verge of doing so， and another “relieving financial institutin" de-
cides to merge with the failing financial institution， take over its business or ac・
quire its stock， DIC can extend “Financial Assistance" to the relieving finan-
cial institution to facilitate the merger or other actions mentioned above. 
Financial Assistance may take such forms as money grants， loans， deposits， 
purchase of assets， guarantee of liabilities， and acceptance of liabilities by 
DIC. 
2. Recent Cases of Financial Assistance by DIC 
On October 16， 1991， the /yo Bank， which has its principal 0血cein the 
City of Matuyama， received approval from the Minister of Finance of its appli-
cation for Financial Assistance to facilitate its merger with the fai1ng Toho 
Sogo Bank， which had its principal office also in the City of Matuyama. On the 
fol1owing day， the /yo Bank applied to the DIC for Financial Assistance. 
DIC's Management Committee met on October 28 and decided to extend 
Financial Assistance to the /yo Bank. The Financial Assistance was implement-
ed on Apri11， 1992. To be more accurae， DIC has extended to /yo Bank a float-
ing interest loan in the aggregate amount of 18 billion for a period of 5・yearsat 
the rate equal to the coupon rate of the 10・yearGovernment bonds minus 5%. 
By this loan， /yo Bank can save interest expenses by as much as 12 bil1ion by 
the end of the 5ヴearperiod. 
On May 21， 1992， the Sanwa Bank， which is one of the city banks and has 
its principal office in Osaka， recieved approval from the Minister of Finance of 
its application for “Financial Assistance" to facilitate its merger with the fai1-
ing Toyo Shinkin Bank， which had its principal office also in Osaka. DICs 
Management Committee met on J une 1 and decided to extend “Financial As-
sistance" (grant of 120 billion) to the Sanwa Bank. The grant was provided on 
October 1， 1992. In fact， most of the branches of Toyo Shinkin Bank have 
been sold to 22 Shinkin banks in the region of Osaka. 
VII. ConcIusion 
We have briefly reviewd recent development in the J apanese financial sys-
tem as wel1 as the prudential supervision by the BOJ. As we have shown， the 
Japanese banking sector is now facing of not only the immediate problem of 
writing-off large amount of non-performing loans， but also the more fun-
damental problem of restructuring the environment which surrounds the finan-
cial sysem as a whole. The improvement of the bankruptcy procedures is one 
of the area where such restructuring should be necessitated. We also find it 
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necessary to improve the accounting rules as well as the disc10sure of informa-
tion so that we can gain a more accurate understanding of the management con-
ditions of the Japanese banks. 
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Appendix: Japanese Financial Institutions 
The J apanese financial institutions are categorized as shown in Chart 1， 
based on type of business and customer. 
The c1assification is done in three stages. The first stage is whether a finan-
cial institution is private or public. The postal saving system is categorized as a 
public financial institution. It collects deposits from the public through its 
extensive network of approximately 24，000 local post offices nationwide. This 
system is operated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunucations. Postal 
savings account for as much as 30% of total deposits made by individuals 
nationwide. 
As the second stage of the c1assification， private financia1 institutions are 
divided into intermediaries and the other financial institutions. The latter in-
c1ude securities houses， which play a key role in securities markets for equities 
and bonds through their broking， dealing， selling， and underwriting functions. 
In addition， they also deal in certificates of deposits (CDs)， and bankers' accep-
tances (BAs) and offer medium-term government bond funds. There are more 
than 200 securities houses in J apan， but the “Big Four"， iふ ，Nomura， Daiwa， 
Nikkou， and Yamaichi， dominate capital markets as they account for about 
70% of total underwriting volume and near1y half of al trading on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. 
Fina11y， the private financial intermediaries are divided into depositary insti-
tutions and non-depositary institutions. 
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1. Depositary Institutions 
There are four types of depositary institutions : ordinary banks， long-term 
financial institutions，自nancialinstitutions for small business， and financial in同
stitutions for agriculture， forestry， and fishery. 
(1) Ordinary Banks 
Ordinary banks consist of four types. 
City banks， only 11 in number， comprise the largest share among ordinary 
banks. Theyaccount for about 25% of the total deposits of al financial institu-
iions. City banks are located in large cities and have extensive nationwide 
branch network. They supply most of short-term corporate finance require-
ments in Japan and also have international business network. They maintain 
c10se ties with large corporations as their “Main Banks. " They not only pro-
vide a large amount of loans to those firms， but also invest heavily in their eq凶・
ty sh紅白.Many of those banks are even inc1uded in informal industrial group 
called “Zaibatsu. " 
Regiona/ banks have their headquarters in smaller cities and most of their 
business is within narrower area such as prefectures. They engage in the same 
activities as city banks， but on a smaller scale. However， regional banks de-
pend more on deposits by individuals， and their lending customers are mainly 
individuals and small-to medium-sized businesses. 
Member banks 01 the Second Association 01 Regiona/ Bαnks (or， second-
tier regional banks) were formerly categorized under financial institutions for 
small business邸 sogobanks， which were transformed into ordinary banks in 
February 1989. Sogo banks， based on the Sogo Bank Law of 1951， had their 
roots in a common traditional financing institution called “Mujin Compa-
nies" and were designated as financial institutions for small businesses. 
However， inparallel with the progress of financial liberalization and inter幽
nationalization， the business activities of sogo banks became similar to those 
of the other ordinary banks. Thus， with the aim of promoting fair competi-
tion， sogo banks were permitted to change their status into that of ordinary 
banks based on the Banking Law. In 1991 the Toho Sogo Bank， which was the 
last remaining sogo bank， became an ordinary bank as a result of merging with 
the Iyo Bank. 
Foreign Banks are defined as branches or agencies established in J apan by 
banks of foreign countries. According to the provisions of the Banking Law， a 
license should be obtained from the MOF for each branch when a foreign bank 
wishes to establish branches and engage in banking activities in Japan. Thus， 
foreign banks have the same legal position as ordinary banks. A characteristic 
of foreign banks is that their main sources of funds are Euro-money borrow-
ings from their head ofi.ces 0 
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(100皿il1ionyen) 
Number of Number of CapitaJ (or Deposits and Loans Securities 
institutions business 0鐙ce" capitaUzation) debt issued outstandingb held' 
1 3，555 37，741 2，039，080" 2，183，830' 464，435' 
64 7，751 16，740 1，585，998' 1，222，733' 333，481' 
66 4，820 6，097 84，063' 501，244 100，038 
89 140 18，978 106，827 21，666 
3 77 8，854 579，056 473，434 44，489 
7' 397 8，264 1，257，530' 581，982" 733，754" 
17 1，000 99，249 39，182 41，618 
440 8，233 3，294 849，436 624，891 116，0哩3
12 125 26，712 14，642 5，962 
397 2，989 2，116 224，498 180，598 16，683 
150 19，441 1，462 14，796 
47 658 631 75，427 29，407 13，“4 
101 2，833 136，473 113，475 25，890 
40 750 333，471 127，459 110，126 
47 262 1，847 459，794 103，852 10，040 
3，446 16，164 1，740 606，252 159，214 34，883 
35 n.a. 286 21，856 7，247 2，557 
1，661 2，114 1，347 22，187 9，460 313 
20 20 793 387，9241 
27" 20，400 726 1，389，03び 562，435 615，342 
2Si 6，446 6，213 242，243' 75，570 111，531 
48' 48 502 200，0391 78，274 90，758 
122 0.8. 125，246 
n.8. n.a. 0.8. 529，4911 0.8. 
3m 3 178 n.a. 
3 9 137 23，7∞ 
2100 3，232 12，517 33，155。 20，345 
6l' 12 14 438，4790 判。，3610' 93 
24，190 1，556，007 5，937 
2，025，608 863，299 
14 2，340 96，466' 106，126 295 
2 9，673 64，337' 76，478 290 
1 30，070 40，457' 67，568 
152 809 74，256' 75，226 
59 954 76，133' 78，495 362 
l 7，016 4，281 
10 7，565' 7，649 58 
22 1，812 52，571' 53，215 360 
14 972 442，461' 443，337 772 
166 132，724' 133，717 1，491 
6 553 10，259' 10，766 91 
5 285 10，712' 1，184 142 
13 n.8. 
iOperating田sets.
iExcludes foreign non，・lifeinsur岨 ceωmpa凶e5.
'Sum of NationaJ MutuaJ 1n叩ranceFed，町ationofagri四 lturaJ∞-op町ativ回 plu.47prefectural mutuaJ insurance federation. of agricultural co・
operatives. 
IFigure for 1989， estimated by the Japan Consumer Credit Industry Association. 
mFigure for smal1 business investment co皿p岨jes.




-Su田 ofcaU-money borrowing and bi1s sold. 
o'Sum of caU-money lending and bi1s bought. 
'Sum of borrowings and securiti田(也c1uding田 ternaJbonds). 
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money since their abilities to collect deposits are limited because of their small 
branch networks. 
(2) Long-term Financial Institutions 
There are two kinds of long-term financial institutions， the first being long-
term credit banks. Three long-term credit banks are established under the 
Long-Term Credit Bank Law and provide mainly long-term financing to 
manufacturing industries. Their primary sources of funds are financia1 deben-
tures. In addition， they are permitted to accept deposits except from individ-
uals. 
The second type of long-term financial institutions is trust banks. Unlike 
long-term credit banks， trust banks are permitted to conduct both ordinary 
banking and trust businesses and those two businesses are conducted under 
separate accounts. There are two kinds of trust banks， i.e.， 7 Japanese trust 
banks and foreign trust banks. In October 1985， foreign banks were allowed to 
engage in trust activities in Japan through separate institutions. Those trust ac-
tivities al10wed inc1ude money trusts， securities investment trusts and so on. 
(3) Financial Institutions for Small Businisses 
As for financial instituitons for small businiesses， shinkin banks are mutual 
associations of small non・financialbusinesses. They provide ordinary banking 
services as well as installment services， mainly to their members. The Zenshin圃
ren Bank acts as a centra1 organization for shinkin banks. 
Credit cooperatives are cooperative financial institutions based on the 
mutual support among owners and employees of small businesses. They are al-
lowed to accept deposits and installment savings from certain kinds of deposi-
tors and can a1so lend or discount bi1s， inprinciple， only to members. The Na-
tional Federation 01 Credit Cooperatives acts as a central organization for 
those cooperatives. 
(4) Financial Institutions for Agriculture， Forestry， and Fishery 
Financial institutions for agriculture， forestry and fishery are organized at 
the nationa1， prefectural， and municipallevels. At the municipallevel， there 
are agricultural cooperatives (Nokyo)， .fishery cooperatives (Gyokyo)， and 
lorestry cooperatives (Shinrin Kumiai). They are mutual associations of farm-
ers， fishermen， and foresters that provide marketing， purchasing， and manage-
ment guidance for their respective products as well as financial services. At the 
prefecturallevel， there are Shinnoren， Shingyoren， and Shinrin Kumiai Ren-
goukai. 
The Norincyukin Bank acts as a central organization for primary indus-
tries， namelyagriculture， forestry， and fishery. It is the largest institutiona1 in-
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vestor in Japan and holds the largest portfolio of Japanese government bonds. 
2. NOIトdepositaryInstitntions 
Insurance companies are non-depositary institutions. The insurance mar-
ket in Japan is the second largest in the world and has been growing at a rapid 
pace. 
The J apanese insurance industry is legally divided into life insurance and 
non-life insurance. The latter is often called fire and marine insurance indus-
try. 
Insurance companies have traditionally used premiums to provide loans to 
large industrial borrowers. However， securities investments have recently been 
increasing and replacing traditionallending activities. Consequently insurance 
companise have become the largest shareholders in J apan. 
NOTES 
(1) The BOJ had the drastic organizational restructuring in May 1990. Its main objec-
tive was to change the organizational structure so that the BOJ would be able to 
cope with the rapidly changing environment characterized by ti.nancial deregura・
tion， globalization of ti.nancial markets and so on. Among those organizational 
changes， Financial and Payment System Department was newly set up in order to 
assume major responsibility for the prudential supervision of ti.nancial institu-
tions and for the construction of an eficient and stable payment system. Mean-
while， Supervision Department continues to be responsible for conducting on-site 
examinations of ti.nancial institutions. 
(2) Since then， BOJ has never extended uncollatelarized loans to企nancialinstitutins 
for the puopose of rescuing troubled ti.nancial institutions. 
(3) All mergers are subject to the restrictions and limitations provided in the Prohibi-
tion of Private Monopoly and Preservation of Fair Trade Act. Two or more com-
panies would not be allowed to merge， ifsuch merger would result in effectively 
restricting the competition in any particular trade sectors or is consummated by 
or through any unfair practice. 
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